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Background on Function Axes

By Ryan Smith and Eva Gregersen

In 2012, we wrote a piece, Determining Function Axes, where we argued for an axial understanding of the cognitive functions. To some extent, this conception had always been part of Jungian typology, but as far as we know, the idea of function axes, and their ontological and epistemological implications, had never been conceptualized in the manner which we employ on the site to this day (barring one exception, which we shall discuss below).[1]

Our piece from 2012 was a casual and ebullient article, simply stating the facts as we saw them. In the meantime, the axial understanding of the functions has risen to considerable popularity and prominence, and it seems to have taken on a life of its own. At the same time, however, some people seem to have trouble grasping the peculiar logic by which it operates.

In this article, we shall explain the Heraclitean logic of the function axes and discuss a possible predecessor to our approach.

The Heraclitean Logic of Function Axes

“I referred to Heraclitus, and [Jung] said Heraclitus knew a lot and he had got the notion of the enantiodromia [i.e. “law of running counter to”] from him. [He said] it was important to have a philosophic background to know the theories of cognition.” – E.A. Bennet: Meetings with Jung (Daimon 1985) p. 27

In the philosophy of Heraclitus, pairs of opposites constitute the essential building blocks of perceived reality. With Heraclitean logic, qualitative opposites are of central importance as determinants of the real, whereas with a modern empirical approach, qualitative or ideal opposites are not particularly meaningful in themselves (and nor is there any reason why they should dictate quantitative and empirical occurrences of their own accord). But this is not how Heraclitus and Jung saw it:[2] In their opinion, if there were no opposites, then there would be no universe at all.[3]

However, Jung seems to have misunderstood Heraclitus on one important point: To Heraclitus, the hidden (if unstable) unity of opposites is an ontological constituent in itself, whereas to Jung, the unity of opposites is a regulatory principle; a means to the end of achieving balance. And with regards to philosophy, this thought should more properly be attributed to Anaximander than to Heraclitus.[4] For Jung’s part, he seems to have been ignorant of this difference and nor did he seem to ever attribute much importance to Anaximander’s work. Be that as it may, however, Jung was nevertheless able to read the same connotations out of Heraclitus as he should more properly have attributed to Anaximander.

For his part, Heraclitus does not merely postulate opposites: He presents them and then elevates their importance until they reach the highest stage of tension, the unity-contradiction: Life-death, hot-cold, wet-dry, up-down  – these are the unity-contradictions in Heraclitus. In Jung, they are called Sensation-Intuition, Thinking-Feeling, and so on.

In a world view that is constituted by unity-contradictions in the manner of Jung and Heraclitus, a thing only has identity by virtue of existing in contradistinction to its opposite, and perceived opposites are really one thing.[5] Indeed, as one scholar has said of Heraclitus, there is in his work a “total unity, in spite of the apparent plurality in all opposite pairs.”[6] As we have argued in our articles on function axes, the same goes for Jungian function pairs. Indeed, as Jung has said: “You begin to have a presentiment of the whole when you embrace your opposite principle, since the whole belongs to both principles, which grow from one root.”[7]

It goes without saying, of course, that the methodology of Jung and Heraclitus is a way of conception that relies far more on Intuition than on the more empirical approach of Sensation and Thinking.[8] Indeed, from the time of classical Athens on, there has been an explicit rivalry between the two modes of grasping where Plato (the Intuitive type) accepted the Heraclitean method, while Aristotle (the Thinking type) rejected it as violating the most fundamental tenets of empirical logic.[9] And indeed these two types of logic – the dialectical and the empirical – have been locked in conflict ever since.

Terminology of Function Axes: Rational/Irrational or Ontological/Epistemological

Though C.G. Jung coined new terms and phrases licentiously, his coinages have often been criticized for being poorly named and inconsistently applied.[10] One of the phrasings that has traditionally been singled out for criticism is Jung’s choice of calling Thinking and Feeling the rational functions while Sensation and Intuition are called irrational.[11] Myers re-worded them Judging and Perceiving, while the American anthropologist Edward Sapir proposed Organized and Unorganized as better names in his view.[12] Either of those phrasings seem better than Jung’s original formulation of “rational-irrational,” which is indeed not very helpful. But coming at the problem from a philosophical angle, we propose that ontological (T/F) and epistemological (S/N) might also serve as helpful names for the functions. Briefly put:

In proposing these terms, we do not mean or hope to supplant the nested terminology of rational/irrational, but only to shed light on their meaning by supplementing the existing perspectives on the matter. Nor do we mean to imply that the terms ontological and epistemological should be taken literally in a technical philosophical sense. Rather, they should be seen as pointers to evoke psychological connotations so that the reader might understand more of the phenomenology of the types.

Indeed, what the German philosopher H.J. Kramer has said of Plato’s ontological principles also applies to the study of the functions: They should be “maintained as rather elastic and flexible and … fundamentally open to amplification both as a whole and its details.”[13] Clutch the conceptual fist too tightly and the psychodynamic value of the functions escapes us, leaving us with a failed behavioral or empirical theory instead.[14]

Possible Influences and Predecessors

As far we are aware, the only possible predecessor to our conceptualization of function axes is Oliver Bryant of Cape Town, South Africa. Bryant has not written publicly on this matter, but having communicated with him personally, we attempt to present his theory below.

According to Bryant, he first thought of his theory around 2011, so it is possible that it is really Bryant, and not us, who should be credited with priority for some of these developments in typology.[15] However, we ourselves were not aware of Bryant’s theory when we first coined our own, and as far as we understand it, Bryant’s theory was originally a theory pertaining to four-letter type codes, not functions. At any rate, we have previously credited and alluded to Bryant’s idea on the site. In the following we shall attempt to present his idea with more clarity.

Outline of Bryant’s Conjecture[16]

According to Bryant, his theory started as a way to differentiate NTJs and NTPs. Bryant’s idea was founded in observing the differences between Bayesian and Frequentist modes of reasoning, which he saw as conceptually similar to the phenomenology of NTJs (Bayesian) and NTPs (Frequentists), respectively.

In a nutshell, asked to resolve the same problem:

As said, the idea was originally conceived to differentiate NTJs and NTPs. However, it was later expanded by Bryant to encompass all of the types in the following manner:

So as can hopefully be seen from this presentation, Bryant’s ideas bear significant resemblance to our own work on function axes, and it is possible that the priority for much of our thinking on the matter should actually accrue to Bryant. However, in the final instance we will leave the exact extent to which our ideas are similar for the reader to judge.

***

Image of Heraclitus in the article commissioned from artist Georgios Magkakis.

NOTES


[1] Jung: Psychological Types §708

[2] Jung: Psychological Types §704

[3] Vamvacas: The Founders of Western Thought (Springer 2009) p. 105

[4] The Anaximander fragment (DK 12B1) reads: “The Boundless is the first principle of things that are. It is that from which the coming-to-be [of things and qualities] takes place, and it is that into which they return when they perish, by mortal necessity, giving satisfaction to one another and making reparation for their injustice, according to the order of time.”

[5] Heraclitus: Fragment (DK B111): “It is disease that makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, and weariness rest.”

[6] Vamvacas: The Founders of Western Thought (Springer 2009) p. 106

[7] Jung: The Red Book LN 248

[8] As if the similarities already noted were not sufficient, there is also in Heraclitus too the observation that the object under scrutiny changes in appearance and value according to the orientation, identity, and point of view of the observer (DK B22). Likewise, to Heraclitus, what is superficially dissimilar is really interdependent when examined on a deeper level (DK B51). Again we should say that it is no different with function axes.

[9] Aristotle: Metaphysics §1050b

[10] Johnston: Jung’s Compass of Psychological Types (CreateSpace 2011) p. xiii

[11] Jung’s original choice of rational/irrational seems to be have loosely inspired by Bergson. Bair: Jung (Little and Brown 2004) p. 274

[12] Sapir: Culture, Language, and Personality (University of California Press 1949) p. 169

[13] Kramer: Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics (State University of New York Press 1990) p. 91

[14] Reynierse: The Case Against Type Dynamics (Journal of Psychological Type, 69, 2009)

[15] Bryant: Personal Communication (2015)

[16] All of the following written on the basis of personal communication with Bryant (2015).

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