By Ryan Smith
4.1 Gaze upon things which, though far off, are still firmly present to the mind
4.2 For you shall not sever being from holding fast to being
4.3 For it neither scatters itself everywhere, in every way throughout the cosmos,
4.4 Nor gathers itself together.
This fragment asserts that the primordial One is all-permeating, indivisible, and beyond all dualisms. The fragment finds a parallel in the Isha Upanishad, which likewise asserts that the true form of reality is a continuous stretch of absolute being, standing “far, yet near.”[1]
Since the primordial One is all-permeating and without opposition, this entails that reality, when viewed from the standpoint of the One (i.e. The Way of Truth), is really nothing but the One. Hence it follows that when you gaze at anything, you will inevitably and simultaneously also be gazing at everything. Again this fragment finds a parallel in the Isha Upanishad, which instructs that “…he who sees everywhere the Self in all existences and all existences in the Self … has perfect knowledge.”[2] Parmenides, being a different breed of metaphysician, would no doubt prefer to switch ‘the Self’ (Atman) for ‘the One,’ thus rendering the passage “…he who sees everywhere the One in all existences and all existences in the One has perfect knowledge.” This is really the whole of the meaning of Fragment 4.
From the point of view of the One, anything that can be thought or perceived is nothing but the One. Since the One stands alone without a second, there can never be anything else – no second, no counterpart, and hence no “other” to gaze at. Being cannot be severed from Being without succumbing to the false dualisms inherent in the Way of Seeming. True reality is one continuous stretch of “is-ness” without any duality or opposition whatsoever. Consequently, anything that is perceived according to the Way of Truth is perceived in a non-dual manner that avoids the delusions of Seeming, that is, the confusions of self-imposed dualisms upon the real.
In our analysis of Fragment 2, we noted that one could refer to the primordial One as a Greek version of Brahman. That this is an exceedingly profitable comparison can be seen in the fact that everything I have just said is paralleled and contained in a single stanza of the Vedantic text The Crest Jewel of Discrimination, the authorship of which is commonly ascribed to Adi Shankara. It states: “The entire universe perceived by the mind is nothing but Brahman; there is nothing outside Brahman, just as jugs and vessels of clay consist only of clay. The distinction … is only due to deception.”[3] So once again, when we perceive Brahman or the One, there is simply one continuous stretch of being, and no distinction between “objects” near or far, since there is only one continuous entity, namely the One.
Now, someone whose habitual thought-patterns are bound up with the empirical Way of Seeming, and who has never experienced reality from the standpoint of the Way of Truth, might object that we are not actually able to perceive such a continuous stretch of whole, unsevered Being. A man in Athens will not be able to see what happens in Sparta by gazing at objects in Athens. The point that objects could be “far, yet near,” as Parmenides, the Isha Upanishad, and The Crest Jewel of Discrimination maintain, must therefore be false. But from the standpoint of the Way of Truth, this whole line of criticism is irrelevant, since it relies on an underlying premise inherent to the Way of Seeming: Intrinsic to the problem that A does not perceive B is the dualism between A and B, the exact same dualism that, once it has taken hold of the mind, gives rise to the Way of Seeming (i.e. an empirical and non-transcendental consciousness and a view of the cosmos where objects can supply their own-being and the primordial One “needs not be” [2.5]). Hence it is not particularly surprising that when viewed from the premises that give rise to the Way of Seeming, reality appears to be congruent with the very same axioms we presupposed prior to the investigation. (As we saw in our analysis of Fragment 2, however, it is not that the Way of Truth can lay claim to any privileged status vis-à-vis the Way of Seeming as far as any impartial analysis is concerned: Each route attempts to prove its own worth by viewing itself [and its counterpart] from a set of initial premises that inevitably yield the conclusion that it alone is true and its counterpart false. The Way of Seeming holds that since A in Athens cannot perceive B in Sparta, being cannot be a continuous one. The Way of Truth maintains that for anything to exist then being itself must be. On this latter view, since the cosmos is clearly something rather than nothing, transcendental being must be [2.7-8].)
From the standpoint of empirical consciousness (i.e. the Way of Seeming), it may indeed be true that we are unable to perceive objects and phenomena that lie beyond the reach of our senses. However, from the standpoint of transcendental consciousness (i.e. the Way of Truth), we see that everything in the cosmos is but one nondual manifestation of a singular transcendental entity (i.e. being or the One). This transcendental entity is the primordial source of all that is real; the monolithic and all-pervasive world-principle from which everything in the cosmos must draw its existence. Thus, to perceive according to the Way of Truth, it is necessary to avoid engaging our “two-headed” (6.5), dualistic dispositions, that is, the mental faculties that divide, cut up, and impose partitions on what is really one continuous block of being (8.6) – it is imperative that we do not sever being from being (4.2).
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For (4.1) Daniel Graham proposes the translation: “Look at things though absent for the mind [are still] present securely.”[4] If this translation is accepted instead of a more standard one, it will further corroborate the meaning I have posited for Fragment 4. On this reading, it is easy to form the interpretation that though individual “things” (i.e. objects and phenomena) are absent from the dualistic mindset of seeming, they are still securely present in their true aspect as the primordial One, since differences and dualisms are just false overlays, imposed on the continuous nonduality of the One by mortals (6.4-9; 8.4-6). This reading is furthermore supported by (4.2) where the goddess warns us against cutting the primordial One into parts. The primordial One, after all, is the One that has no second. I include this reading out of a sense of completeness, but ultimately, I do not wish to hinge my exegesis on the particular semantics of specific lines since – as has been argued by Barbara Cassin, Karl Popper and others – such an endeavor is really quite futile.[5]
***
I have suggested that from the standpoint of transcendental being (i.e. the One), anything that is perceived is at the same time everything else, since there is no difference in being and everything is really one, with “being holding fast to being” (4.2). The One is ultimately devoid of all qualities and phenomenalizations, so strictly speaking, the One itself is imperceptible as it is not a thing or phenomenon, but completely absolute.[6] At the same time, it is the primordial One that gives rise to all that is real, and it is really the One we see in all the various forms and “things” that seem to exist in the world. In its true form, the primordial One stands beyond all dualisms and oppositions (8.4-6) and thus does not scatter or unite, but simply IS, one and continuous, standing entirely above the fray of dissolution and confluence.[7]
REFERENCES
Cordero, N.L.: Parmenides Venerable and Awesome Parmenides Publishing 2012
Graham, D.W.: The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy vol. I Cambridge University Press 2011
Guthrie, W.K.C.: A History of Greek Philosophy: Volume 2 Cambridge University Press 1965
Murti, T.R.V.: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism Munshiram Monoharlal 2013
Popper, K.R.: Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography Routledge 2002
NOTES
[1] Isha Upanishad 5
[2] Isha Upanishad 6-7
[3] Vivekachudamani 197, cf. Brahmasutrabhasya 2.1.14
[4] Graham: The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy vol. I p. 213
[5] Cassin, in Cordero: Parmenides Venerable and Awesome p. 59 ff., cf. Popper: Unended Quest p. 21
[6] Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 232
[7] Compare Heraclitus DK B91 (“It scatters and gathers, it comes together and flows away, approaches and departs”) with Parmenides 4.3-4 (“For it neither scatters itself everywhere, in every way throughout the cosmos / Nor gathers itself together”). This parallel has often been taken to mean that Parmenides is consciously polemicizing against Heraclitus as e.g. Guthrie contends in A History of Greek Philosophy: Volume 2 p. 32. This is possible, but not certain. In spite of the commonplace opposition between Parmenides and Heraclitus (construed as rest and motion; being and becoming; stillness and flux), one should not carry this antagonism too far, since the characteristic bivalence in Heraclitus’ ontology (as in e.g. DK B10: “Combinations [are] wholes and not wholes, being alike and being different, in tune and out of tune, and from all things one, and from one all things”) is not completely opposed to the message of Parmenides’ poem. We shall return to the subject of Parmenides vs. Heraclitus at a later point in this study.