{"id":4445,"date":"2014-03-11T12:58:26","date_gmt":"2014-03-11T12:58:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/?p=4445"},"modified":"2020-06-20T22:38:53","modified_gmt":"2020-06-20T22:38:53","slug":"why-plato-is-infj","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/2014\/03\/why-plato-is-infj\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Plato is INFJ"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cNo one before Plato [nor anyone] since has managed the extremely difficult art of dramatic debate on philosophic topics with such \u2026 fascinating art, aided by the union of dialectical subtlety with mystical yearnings, a subtlety which seems to give a hope to mysticism, and a warrant to transcendentalism.\u201d \u2013 G.H. Lewes: Aristotle<\/i>, Smith, Elder & Co. 1864 ed. p. 19<\/p>\n

By Ryan Smith<\/b><\/p>\n

This article proposes to discuss why Plato is INFJ. There are many lines of argument that one could pursue in an attempted demonstration of Plato\u2019s type and not all of them will be covered here. More precisely, this article will focus on why Plato had dominant Ni and inferior Se, as well as why he had a preference for Ti over Te. That means that this article will lack any direct discussion of why Plato had Fe and not Fi (though such a discussion is certainly possible and will be forthcoming in a future article).<\/p>\n

This article assumes the standard model of function orders, which means that someone with dominant Ni and a preference for Ti can only be INFJ. This means that classical Jungians who believe that a function order of Ni-Ti-Fe-Se is possible will not<\/i> find that assessment refuted in this article.<\/p>\n

With these reservations out of the way, let\u2019s get started.<\/p>\n

Definition: The Theory of Forms<\/b><\/p>\n

Before we proceed, let us quickly recap the Theory of Forms. Readers already familiar with this theory can skip to the next heading.<\/p>\n

\"dogs\"<\/a>Plato\u2019s Theory of Forms says that every object in this world is but a pale shadow of the ideal Form<\/i> of the object, which exists only as thought and has no material existence. For example, you may have an actual, physical dog as your pet and your best friend may have another actual, physical dog as his<\/i> pet. But the way Plato sees it, none of these dogs are actually as real as the ideal Form of the Dog, which exists only as an idea. That ideal dog is perfect; physical dogs are imperfect. Physical dogs grow old and die, but the ideal dog is eternal and unchanging and it cannot be altered by anything that takes place on the physical level.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the Forms belong to a higher plane of existence than physical objects. As said, the ideal Form of the Dog is more real than actual, physical dogs. Likewise, even if there were no physical dogs, the Form of the Dog would still exist, as what goes on in the realm of Forms is wholly separated from the realm of matter and physical experience.<\/p>\n

Here is Plato explaining his Theory of Forms, only here he is describing the Form of Beauty instead of the Form of the Dog:<\/p>\n

“The culmination of beauty … [is to] catch sight of something of unbelievable beauty … which gives meaning to all previous encounters [with beauty]. … [It is] something eternal; it doesn’t come-to-be or cease-to-be, and it doesn’t increase or diminish. … It [has] no physical place … [but is] in itself and by itself, constant and eternal … and every beautiful physical object somehow partakes in it, but in such a way that their coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be don’t increase or diminish it at all, and it remains entirely unaffected. … [It is] beauty itself, in its perfect, immaculate purity – not beauty tainted by human flesh and coloring and all that mortal rubbish, but absolute beauty, divine and constant.” \u2013 Plato: Symposium<\/i> \u00a7211a-e<\/p>\n

How the Theory of Forms indicates Ni and Ti<\/b><\/p>\n

It is not hard to see how Plato\u2019s Theory of Forms is a mode of thinking that lends itself well to Ni dominant modes of thought. That the internal representation is more real than the actual physical object reeks of introverted perception. However, unlike Si, which is concerned with the internal representation of specific<\/i> objects<\/a>, Ni is chiefly concerned with the representation of generalized and abstracted classes<\/i> of objects.<\/p>\n

The resultant attitude to specific physical objects can be readily seen in your average INJ: The specific differences between one physical object and another are readily and unconsciously downplayed in the Ni psyche. Where the Si type may notice subtle and elegant differences between drinking his coffee from one mug and not another, all cups will fundamentally be the same to the Ni type, as long as they are able to fulfill their basic function of containing hot liquids that the Ni type means to consume.<\/p>\n

Now if we wish to go further and understand why Plato\u2019s Theory of Forms indicates not just Ni, but also Ti, we should note that where Te sees the empirical facts<\/i> as undeniable and the abstract ideas<\/i> as insubstantial, Ti sees the abstract idea<\/i> as the crux of any matter and simply coerces or ignores the empirical facts that don\u2019t fit the idea. (Myers & Myers: Gifts Differing, <\/i>CPP Books 1993 p. 78 and here<\/a>.)<\/p>\n

Put another way, Ti is not empirically nimble<\/i>. Plato\u2019s idea that Forms exist and do not change according to what goes on in the physical world betrays a psychological yearning for beautiful ideas<\/i> that can be cognized for all eternity with great fullness and certitude. But the pursuit of such a preference has the effect of shutting the actual, physical world out<\/a> from one\u2019s cognitions. That is why Nietzsche, from the point of view of Te, mocked the Ti user\u2019s preference for pure ideas thus:<\/p>\n

“Merely one<\/i> Certainty grant me, ye Gods \u2026 let there be over the sea of uncertainty one small plank, just wide enough to lie on! Everything that exists \u2026 all that is full of life, all this you can have; just give me just one single, poor, empty certainty!” \u2013 Nietzsche: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks<\/i> \u00a711<\/p>\n

In other words, yes, we can pursue the beautiful eternal and unchanging ideas, but if we do, we end up describing nothing but<\/i> ideas. We end up with an empty certitude about something that has no connection to the real world \u2013 as slightly comical figures that seek refuge in an empty fantasy-land because we lack the strength to stomach this world in all its noisy and ever-changing chaos.<\/p>\n

Thus we should assume that \u2013 all other things being equal \u2013 an INTJ would at the onset sympathize with Plato\u2019s idea of Forms but then grow increasingly discontented with it as he learned of Plato\u2019s yearning to keep the Forms entirely distinct from the actual, physical world. Like Nietzsche, an INTJ would as a rule prefer for his ideas to have a bearing on the physical world because of his preference for Te, which is a function that prefers to organize objects<\/a> by an outer standard<\/a> in order to achieve results in the real world.<\/p>\n

Even Immanuel Kant, who had only overcome his own nascent preference for empty abstractions against great inner resistance, could glance back at Plato and see that:<\/p>\n

“Plato abandoned the world of the senses … [and ventured] upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support.” \u2013 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason<\/i> \u00a7A5\/B8-9<\/p>\n

Plato\u2019s Inferior Se<\/b><\/p>\n

“About the acquirement of pure knowledge, is the body a hindrance or not? … We neither hear nor see anything accurately … and if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be either.\u201d \u2013 Plato: Phaedo<\/i> \u00a765ab<\/p>\n

Then we have the matter of why Plato had inferior Se. As Jung\u2019s student Marie-Louise von Franz says, the inferior Se of INJs is characterized by being extremely intense and has an \u2018all or nothing\u2019 manner to it. (Von Franz, in von Franz & Hillman: Lectures on Jung\u2019s Typology<\/i>, Spring Publications 1984 p. 25 cf. pp. 34-36.)<\/p>\n

\"platon11\"<\/a>In the words of von Franz, the Se of INJs is often \u201cterribly immoderate\u201d in one direction or another and so the standard behavioral indicators of inferior Se are either extreme sensory indulgence or an ascetic world-denial; \u201ca starving of the senses.\u201d Sometimes the two extremes can even be united in the same person, as in the case of Nietzsche<\/a> who was in the main sexually abstemious and homeless, but was at the same time extremely sense-indulgent when it came to music, art, and food.<\/p>\n

With regards to Plato, we have some dubious testimony that he was decadently sense-indulgent when he was young (Sextus Empiricus: Against the Professors<\/i> \u00a71.258). But the overarching picture of both Plato\u2019s life and thought is that he was extremely<\/i> world-denying, and he actually speaks directly of \u201cstarving the senses\u201d in more places than one. (Republic<\/i> \u00a7514a\u2013520a; Theaetetus<\/i> \u00a7184-186)<\/p>\n

In fact, as the scholar John D. Turner has pointed out, once we place Plato in his proper historical context among his peers, we see that he was even more world-denying than is usually thought: Up until Plato, almost everything about Greek philosophy and religion had consisted in accepting the world through the ordinary human experience of sensory corporeality. (Turner: Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition,<\/i> Les Presses De L’Universite Laval Quebec 2006 ed. p. 448 and also n2.)<\/p>\n

Plato then comes along and flips the notion of what is real on its head: What was formerly real (concrete sensory experience) is now deemed un<\/i>real by him \u2013 as mere illusions that cloud mortal judgment. What is real to Plato, is only the incorporeal, immaterial, and unchanging Forms that exist in a realm of pure Being that stands apart from material and sensory experience of the cosmos.<\/p>\n

Thus Plato\u2019s denying stance towards the physical and sensible world was even more radical than is usually assumed. Once we place Plato in his proper historical context, we see that Plato\u2019s world-denying stance had no intellectual, cultural, or social predecessor and that it can only be explained by Plato\u2019s personal volition<\/i> – something that may in turn be traced back to his psychological disposition.<\/p>\n

Historiographical Note on Plato\u2019s Type<\/b><\/p>\n

At the time of this writing (2014), it appears that INFJ is the most predominant assessment of Plato\u2019s type in the community, closely followed by INTJ.<\/p>\n