{"id":5673,"date":"2014-12-18T14:28:01","date_gmt":"2014-12-18T14:28:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/?p=5673"},"modified":"2020-06-20T22:38:51","modified_gmt":"2020-06-20T22:38:51","slug":"on-the-dubious-use-of-fallacies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/2014\/12\/on-the-dubious-use-of-fallacies\/","title":{"rendered":"On the Dubious Use of Fallacies"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Ryan Smith and Rachel Wood<\/strong><\/p>\n

Internet debates have seen what one could refer to as \u2018the rise of the blowhard\u2019 \u2013 people who throw down the name of a fallacy as if it somehow \u2018wins\u2019 them the discussion. But the identification of fallacies, even when properly executed, can rarely be used to prove the veracity of a position. Oftentimes, the identification of a fallacy is merely useful in pinpointing the holes in a given piece of reasoning at best. Contrary to what debating culture in general might have you believe, pinpointing the weaknesses in an opponent\u2019s reasoning is not the same thing as proving your own position right.<\/p>\n

In this article, we look into four popular \u201cfallacies\u201d that are often employed in dubious ways. It is our contention that a closer look at these matters will reveal that the business of logical fallacies is not at all as black and white as it is often made to seem.<\/p>\n

1: OCCAM\u2019S RAZOR<\/strong><\/p>\n

When faced with two competing explanations of a phenomenon where it is not possible to achieve certainty, the simpler hypothesis must be preferred.<\/em><\/p>\n

Our Comment: <\/strong>Occam\u2019s Razor is a reasonable tool in fields like science and history where “facts” exist and where these facts can be accounted for as parts of a larger system, based merely on our knowledge of yet more facts. But ironically, Occam\u2019s Razor is mainly used in fields like psychology and philosophy where \u201cfacts\u201d are limited and have to be accompanied by a heavy dose of speculation. In other words, Occam\u2019s Razor is often used in situations where it is not a suitable form of appeal. Western philosophy, for example, is founded entirely on assumptions. So for someone who claims to adhere to Occam\u2019s Razor, the rational course of action is often to make no assumptions at all. \u00a0<\/strong>Such a person would be unable to have any metaphysics, or any philosophy at all, until he acquires a philosophy that is entirely devoid of assumptions and first principles. If everything philosophical \u2013 including the philosophy of science \u2013 is founded on unproven assumptions, then Occam\u2019s Razor becomes meaningless, and the true adherent of Occam\u2019s Razor would simply say: \u201cI don\u2019t believe a thing.\u201d And in the case of the psychologist, that same adherent of Occam\u2019s Razor would follow Jung in postulating some species of solipsism<\/a> (i.e. the belief that only the individual consciousness is knowable to the individual). The psychologist who truly obeyed the Razor could do away with the entire idea of ever knowing another person\u2019s type \u201cin itself\u201d \u2013 all that such a psychologist could know was what type the other person seemed to be to his personal consciousness. Thus, the claim that Nietzsche was an Ni type could never be reasoned to be objectively more resistant to falsification than the belief that Nietzsche was an Se type \u2013 everything would be relative to the beliefs and impressions of the individual\u2019s own consciousness.<\/p>\n

The thing about Occam\u2019s Razor is that we all subscribe to a series of deeply-held beliefs. Not only do these beliefs differ from person to person<\/a>, we also tend to hold on to them because we are predisposed to finding them appealing. In other words, the ideas that we cherish the most are not merely the product of deliberation \u2013 we also believe in them because they make intuitive, pre-cognitive sense to us<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"complex\"<\/a>A whole range of factors go into determining which ideas the individual innately finds appealing. For example, the Big Five<\/a> trait Openness to Experience can be shown to correlate with the level of complexity that one intuitively prefers. With regard to philosophy, David Hume had a higher complexity preference than Ayn Rand did<\/a>. With regard to typology, C.G. Jung had a higher complexity preference than David Keirsey, and so on. And so, oftentimes when someone throws down Occam\u2019s Razor as a way to \u201cwin\u201d the argument, all they are doing is demanding that someone else\u2019s complexity preference should be cut down to size until it matches their own. In other words, they are neither proving nor disproving anything, but merely re-affirming their own confirmation bias. They are using their own subjective standard to assert that the complexity of a field could not possibly be more<\/em> than what they prefer, and they are begging the question as to why the complexity could not possibly be less <\/em>than what they prefer.<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Use of Occam\u2019s Razor: <\/strong>\u201cYou say that there are multiple universes<\/a> parallel to this one. I say that there is only this universe. My hypothesis is simpler and therefore the correct one.\u201d \/ \u201cYou say that life on this planet came about due to a series of extraordinary coincidences. I say that life was put here by an Intelligent Designer. My hypothesis is simpler and therefore the correct one.\u201d<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Use of Occam\u2019s Razor with Regard to Typology: <\/strong>\u201cI say that Kanye West is impolite and self-centered, and therefore he is an Fi type. You say that Kanye West is an Fe type whose type is blurred by his Narcissistic personality style<\/a>. My hypothesis is simpler and therefore the correct one.\u201d<\/p>\n

2: APPEAL TO AUTHORITY<\/strong><\/p>\n

Because an expert or authority says something, it must therefore be true.<\/em><\/p>\n

Our comment:<\/strong> The Appeal to Authority is not a valid argument. But the fact that Appeals to Authority are not arguments in themselves tends to get blown out of proportion and taken by blowhards to mean that their opinion is just as good as that of a consensus among experts. Appeals to Authority are not arguments<\/em>, but that does not mean that it is by definition wrong to defer to the claims of experts with deep domain knowledge and extensive experience in their field. Of course it is entirely possible that the experts are wrong, but after all there is usually a reason that a given view is the majority view among experts.<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Objection to Appeal to Authority:<\/strong> \u201cScientists have their opinions about how to cure leukemia, and I have mine, so we\u2019ll just have to agree to disagree.\u201d<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Objection to Appeal to Authority with Regard to Typology:<\/strong> \u201cEvery major authority on typology thinks person X is type Y, but even though I\u2019ve never produced a sustained argument for my position and I\u2019m not a recognized authority in this field, my view is just as good as theirs<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

3: REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM<\/strong><\/p>\n

The act of exaggerating an argument to its farthest possible extent (i.e. to absurdity).<\/em><\/p>\n

The cry of Reductio ad Absurdum<\/em> is often used by people as a means to defend their own sloppy reasoning. Some textbooks have even taken to describing the Reductio ad Absurdum <\/em>as a fallacy \u201cbecause anything can be reduced to absurdity.\u201d But in fact, the Reductio ad Absurdum <\/em>need not be a fallacy at all, but may just as well be used as a means to expose<\/em> the fallacy in a given piece of reasoning.<\/p>\n

Employed properly, the Reductio ad Absurdum <\/em>stays with the original line of reasoning, but then exaggerates it to a point where it breaks the position of the person who advanced that reasoning to begin with. Unlike the Slippery Slope fallacy, the Reductio ad Absurdum<\/em> does not give itself a license to pretend that there is only one possible outcome when in reality there are many (e.g. \u201cIf we allow racist cartoons to be printed, ethnic minorities will eventually be sent to camps.\u201d). Often, the Reductio ad Absurdum<\/em> simply reveals that a person\u2019s stated reasoning is incomplete \u2013 that he or she needs to sharpen his\u00a0 reasoning by coming up with additional and improved qualifications for his argument. This may sound trivial, but many a would-be expert has seen his position disintegrate and crumble in his hands<\/a> because he was forced to flesh out his qualifications. Far from being inherently fallacious, then, the Reductio ad Absurdum<\/em> can often be a useful tool in logic.<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Objection to Reductio ad Absurdum:
\n<\/strong>Peter: \u201cOnly birds have feathers.\u201d
\nSusan: \u201cThen what about East Asian and Native American shamans who wear feathered suits in connection with certain rituals? Are they birds?\u201d
\nPeter: \u201cIf you’re going to be childish, I’m not going to debate this anymore!\u201d<\/p>\n

Example of Unreasonable Objection to Reductio ad Absurdum with Regard to Typology:<\/strong>
\nPeter: \u201cI can always verify that my type assessments are correct, because people\u2019s facial features and\/or eye movements give away their type<\/a>.\u201d
\nSusan: \u201cThen that must mean that you can type people of whom you have no prior knowledge by merely watching videos of them with the sound turned off.\u201d
\nPeter: \u201cDon\u2019t be stupid! I\u2019m making a serious point.\u201d<\/p>\n

4: ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE<\/strong><\/p>\n

Any reference to evidence that is observed outside of repeatable, controlled experiments is by definition fallacious.<\/em><\/p>\n

Our Comment:<\/strong> People often dismiss anecdotal evidence for no real reason. The refusal to admit anecdotal evidence into a discussion is especially impertinent when large numbers of people report seeing the same thing, such as the UFO sightings reported by both Allied and Axis pilots<\/a> during World War 2, or the comparable events reported by large numbers of near-death experience survivors. Of course, these occurrences are not proof of aliens or an afterlife \u2013 but they are evidence of something<\/em>, and that evidence cannot be categorically dismissed.<\/p>\n

Secondly, not all types of anecdotal evidence are equally anecdotal. If large numbers of internationally respected scientists reported a similar anomaly, it would be foolish to put those reports on par with the premonitions of the local fortune teller. Quantity and quality of reports tend to differ, even if they are both \u201canecdotal.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ultimately, all of our knowledge rests on personal experience. Only a small modicum of that experience is ever formalized, controlled, and elevated to the status of \u201cformal evidence.\u201d Even in cases where formal knowledge actually is<\/em> available to guide our outlook, that evidence rarely reaches a certainty of 100%. Indeed, we are more often faced with matters of more or less than matters of black and white. In the absence of formalized evidence, anecdotal evidence cannot be categorically dismissed.<\/p>\n

Example<\/strong> of Unreasonable Objection to Anecdotal Evidence: <\/strong>\u201cCharles Darwin was bitten by a benchuca bug in 1835. He later complained of palpitations of the heart, gastric and intestinal pains, fatigue and lethargy, shivering spells, and insomnia. These symptoms are often caused by a parasite carried by many benchucas. But the tests that Darwin\u2019s doctors ran could find nothing wrong with him. Therefore nothing was<\/em> wrong with him, and he was just a hypochondriac.\u201d<\/p>\n

Example <\/strong>of Unreasonable Objection to Anecdotal Evidence with Regard to Typology: <\/strong>\u201cC.G. Jung devised his typology on the basis of anecdotal evidence. Therefore his typology can\u2019t have scientific validity.\u201d [Note: A <\/em>Professor of Psychology<\/em><\/a> actually said exactly this, and Jungian typology *does* have <\/em>some scientific validity<\/em><\/a>.]<\/em><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Of course, none of this is to say that there actually are <\/em>several parallel universes; that Kanye West actually does<\/em> have a preference for Fe over Fi; that more complexity is necessarily better<\/a>; that the scientific consensus on how to cure leukemia cannot be improved; that Friedrich Nietzsche actually was<\/em> an Ni type; that \u201cface reading\u201d actually is<\/em> pseudoscience<\/a>; that Charles Darwin actually was <\/em>infected by a parasite, or that Jungian typology, given future and more cogent standards of measurement, will turn out to have strong scientific validity (or none at all).<\/p>\n

As the American statistician Cosma Shalizi has said, there are people who desire to possess profound knowledge without having to make a profound effort at thinking. From afar, Jungian typology may sometimes look like a\u00a0magic wand that miraculously enables the individual to come up with\u00a0deep and special insights without making much of an effort. However, as the multitude\u00a0of would-be experts<\/a> and ill-researched material on Jungian typology attests,\u00a0there can be no substitute for effort.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the idea that\u00a0memorizing a list\u00a0of fallacies can in itself<\/em> make you an\u00a0expert on science and epistemology is perhaps not that different from the idea that\u00a0acquainting oneself with typology can in itself<\/em> make you an expert on personology and psychology. For indeed, as Bruce Lee says in Game of Death<\/em>, the multiplicity of life is like a broken rhythm to which “rehearsed routines lack the flexibility to adapt.”<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

We would give ourselves the same Complexity Preference as van der Hoop, if not for the fact that we have begun to follow Jung in exploring the normative side of typology, e.g.\u00a0here<\/a>, here<\/a>, here<\/a>, and here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Ryan Smith and Rachel Wood Internet debates have seen what one could refer to as \u2018the rise of the blowhard\u2019 \u2013 people who throw down the name of a fallacy as if it somehow \u2018wins\u2019 them the discussion. But the identification of fallacies, even when properly executed, can rarely be used to prove the[\u2026] Continue Reading<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-psychology"],"amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5673"}],"version-history":[{"count":18,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5673\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5696,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5673\/revisions\/5696"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5673"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.idrlabs.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}