“… many are the afflictions that burst in and blunt their thinking. In their lives, they see a meagre portion of life … trusting only in whatever each has encountered as he was driven here and there, yet he falsely claims to have discovered the whole. … Mortal minds have no more power than this.” – Empedocles: Fragment BK31 B2
“People are seldom impartial where ultimate things, the great problems of science and life, are concerned. Each of us is governed in such cases by deep-rooted internal prejudices, into whose hands our speculation unwittingly plays.” – Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle (SE 18:59)
By Ryan Smith
The following installment has been stitched together from my previous articles Freud and Empedocles and Function Biases in Buddhism and Vedanta. Both of these articles were published in 2014, specifically in the period of time that fell between the publication of part 1 and 2 of the present series. However, since not all readers have had the ability (or patience) to peruse those articles in their original contexts and lengths, the sections of these articles that pertain the most to the concept of function axes have been reproduced here.
The Three Laws of Ontological Prejudice
In Function Biases in Buddhism and Vedanta, I suggested three laws of ontological prejudice that are commonly seen in relation to the Fi/Te and Fe/Ti axes. They are:
- All else being equal, an Fi/Te type is more likely to regard the self and one’s personal identity as an ontological entity of primary importance. An Fi/Te type is more likely to say that “I’m me and you are you,” while an Fe/Ti type is more likely to believe that “we’re all one, all cut from the same cloth.”
- All else being equal, the ontology of an Fi/Te type is more likely to consist of distinct objects and entities, whereas the ontology of an Fe/Ti type is more likely to consist of interdependent objects that are “fuzzy around the edges” in the Fe/Ti type’s cognition and tend to blend into each other. The relation of parts to the whole in the Fi/Te ontology resembles that of peas in a pod; in the Fe/Ti ontology, it resembles that of waves upon an ocean.
- All else being equal, an Fi/Te type is more likely to subscribe to some stripe of materialism or substance metaphysics, while an Fe/Ti type is more likely to believe in a species of non-materialist or process metaphysics. Put another way, the Fi/Te axis has a phenomenological bias in favor of materialism and substance; the Fe/Ti axis a predilection for non-materialism and process.
To be clear, I am not saying that the functions themselves determine a person’s viewpoint – that would be an error. That is why, in my writings on Jungian typology, I have always taken care to distinguish between mental processes and mental contents; between the structures of consciousness itself and the representations and judgments that are contained in that consciousness. With respect to this dichotomy, a function is a process, and a metaphysical stance (such as a commitment to materialism) is an end product; a piece of content. So rather than professing that the functions themselves are the determinants of the individual’s viewpoint, what I am saying is that some viewpoints flow more naturally from certain functions than others.
Ontological Prejudice of the Functions
As a complement to this line of thought, my article on Freud and Empedocles suggested the following series of ontological prejudices, again relating only to the Fi/Te and Fe/Ti axes:
- Ti does not naturally perceive phenomena in terms of matter, but rather in terms of the abstract, subjective idea which the individual phenomenon represents. The elements of physical existence that do not fit with the pursuit of the abstract idea are ignored or neglected (e.g. “it is a nonessential feature, let somebody else take care of that”).[1] The abstract idea that is pursued by Ti is immaterial; it is imagined rather than proven; it is a possibility, not a necessity.[2] It follows that matter appears as a necessity – a stricture upon the idea that the Ti type feels inclined to look beyond or break out of.
- Fe does not naturally perceive phenomena in terms of matter, but rather in terms of the sentiments that they elicit in the psyche.[3] With Fe, there is an involuntary inclination to perceive objects as sentient beings to be sympathized with (e.g. “the Earth has a soul”). Consciousness is thus unwittingly ascribed the primacy over matter. Certainly, most Fe types would concede that we are made of both consciousness and matter. But according to the Fe prejudice, our defining feature is our consciousness – the awareness that experiences and contains sentiments.
- Te does not naturally perceive phenomena in terms of events, but in terms of objective laws that standardize and shut out that which does not conform to the law.[4] Overarching ideas like “energy” and “matter” allow for the greatest extension of such laws into all spheres of human existence, including psychic life. Matter is therefore unwittingly accepted as holding the primacy over consciousness; indeed to many a Te type, consciousness is just matter experiencing itself. It follows that sentiments and feelings, which are often personal and illogical, and which no known law can dominate or sort out, are thus accidental and secondary features of existence.
- Fi: You have your values, and I have mine. But you are not me. We each experience our highest values through our own personal, subjective psyche. I cannot adjust my innermost, truest ideas to fit with yours, nor can you adjust yours to fit with mine. We are not to place demands upon each other, but to tolerate each other in the way we are, so that we are both free to go our own way. Thus we cognize our deepest thoughts and feelings through the purity of our own subject, which is strictly our own. A great gulf separates your innermost nature from mine; this gulf may be material in nature, or it may not be. All I know is that it is there.
NOTES
[1] Myers: Gifts Differing (Davis Black 1980) p. 78
[2] Jung: Psychological Types §628
[3] Jung: Psychological Types §595
[4] Jung: Psychological Types §585