By Ryan Smith
5.1 It is the same to me,
5.2 From where I begin, for to there I shall come back again.
This fragment expands upon the meaning of fragments 2, 3, and 4. The assertion is that since the One is continuous and devoid of all partitions (8.4-6), there is no optimal “point” from which to start when setting out to describe it. Because there is no “other,” anything that is analyzed, cognized, or discoursed about is the One, i.e. a single undifferentiated stretch of being, synonymous with the entirety of the cosmos (4.2). Since there are no spatial partitions or dualisms, there cannot be any “points” when reality is viewed in accordance with the Way of Truth. Consequently, all “points” are equally suitable when setting out to describe the reality of transcendental being since ultimately all are equally false.
From the standpoint of the Way of Truth, it is not possible to analyze isolated “points” or partitions of the One, since in its true aspect, the One really continuous and whole (8.6). Consequently, the only subject available for inquiries compliant with the Way of Truth is the totality of the cosmos, that is, the transcendental reality of undifferentiated being. Accordingly, any discourse conducted in accordance with the Way of Truth implies a ‘round’ view of the object, where what initially seems like an object, standing in dualistic opposition to other objects, is in the final instance revealed to be nothing but the One itself (along with all other objects and phenomena that were initially supposed to be discrete from the object; they also are It). Thus there can be no spatial distinctions at all, since as the Katha Upanishad says, “what is over there is the same over here.”[1] Whoever sees multiplicity has failed to fuse with the primordial One and still perceives according to the Way of Seeming.
The phenomenological reality of the One as a transcendental entity underlying the whole of the cosmos is largely inexpressible.[2] Language presents an inevitable stumbling block to the teaching of it. Any concept employed to describe it is bound to be unsatisfactory since concepts invariably distinguish “this” from “that” and one thing from others.[3] Since all concepts are inherently dualistic and devised by the empirical mind, they have more to do with Seeming than with Truth.[4] But on the other hand, if the teacher never said anything, the student would not understand. Thus, all teachings that point towards transcendental reality must both present the student with concepts and admonish him to abandon them again (lest the student mistakes the concept of the One for the transcendental reality that the concept aims to point towards).[5]
Historically, the practice of self-refuting dialects reached its zenith in the work of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. But neither Parmenides nor the Upanishads go anywhere near as far as Nagarjuna when it comes to relinquishing their own concepts. Still, the basic didactic aim of imparting knowledge of the One can be compared to the goddess giving the youth a net that will enable him to catch a very special kind of fish (i.e. the One).[6] Once the fish is caught, however, the net will seem like an artefact of Seeming (not Truth), since it was conceptualized as a specific teaching (of “this” rather than “that”) and expressed through language (whereas the overpowering fullness and all-pervasive reality of the One cannot be expressed in language, but indicated at most).[7] The conclusion is that if a teaching that aims to acquaint the initiate with the One is imparted by someone who knows what she is doing (as the goddess surely does), the teacher will come back and destroy the net once the fish is caught.[8]
Indeed, “once the fish is caught” and the Way of Truth has been attained, a certain irreverence usually follows concerning the spatial distinctions and oppositions that seemed so real when one perceived according to the Way of Seeming. Besides Parmenides (5.1-2), (8.4-6), (8.42-5), and the Katha Upanishad’s instruction that “what is over there is the same over here,” one could also mention the Isha Upanishad’s admonition that the transcendent world-principle is “far, yet near,” or even Parmenides (8.23-5), which holds that being is not “more in any way here and less in any way there … but everywhere is [equally] full of being … all continuous.”[9] As one’s perception of reality is emptied of all differentiated content in accordance with the Way of Truth, only transcendental being remains as a completely undifferentiated world-principle, synonymous with the whole of the cosmos and encompassing all seeming points as one within its completely homogenous and non-dualistic whole.[10]
Therefore we should not forget one final connotation of Fragment 5, namely that it also functions as an illustration of the dialectical relationship between Seeming and Truth: Prior to imparting knowledge of the One onto the youth, the goddess declares that “it is the same to her, from where she begins, for to there she shall come back again.” When these words are spoken, the youth is still beholden to Seeming and thus perceives the universe to consist of points. However, once the transcendental reality of the One has been caught sight of, the seeming multitude of points will be collapsed to reveal the only point there can be: The continuous block of undifferentiated being.
The meaning of Fragment 5 can thus be summed up as follows:
- Only according to the Way of Seeming are there any points. According to the Way of Truth, there is no plurality of “points,” since the cosmos is but one block of undifferentiated being, “cohering as one” and “continuous” (8.23-5).
- Language cannot adequately express the transcendental reality of the One, but only point towards it. Therefore, teachings that aim to impart knowledge of the One will often return to their point of origin to refute their own concepts, so as to prevent the student from identifying the concept of the One with the One itself (this feature may be a little too advanced for Parmenides, however; see Note 8 above).
- There is a dialectical transition from Seeming, where there appears to be many points, to Truth, where there is only one continuous point. Thus whatever point the goddess sets out from in her mission to impart knowledge of the One onto the youth, it will be “all the same to her,” and she will inevitably come back to that point again, since once the teaching is grasped, all dualistic “points” will be collapsed into a single point. By the end of her injunction, the youth will perceive through Truth and will have understood that all points are without opposition, continuous and cohering as one.
***
The idiom of the self-refuting dialectic, utilized as a device to point towards the Absolute, has often been termed “nihilistic” by scholars. Historically, this charge has especially been levelled at Nagarjuna, although it has also been applied to other philosophies that aim to reveal the Absolute by stilling the process of intellectual concept-making.[11] This misunderstanding is particularly widespread in academic circles since university scholars typically possess a great deal of book knowledge but little meditative insight (gnosis/prajna) and are thus in a particularly unfortunate position to understand how an absence of concepts is not an absence of the real.[12] Not without good reason do the Upanishads warn against taking a knowledge-based approach to the study of Brahman, and not without good reason did Nagarjuna explicitly caution that mistaking concepts for the real is worse than not understanding the shortcomings of Seeming at all.[13]
Concerning Parmenides, his message has traditionally escaped the accusations of nihilism that oftentimes tend to accompany philosophies of the absolute. However, even as Parmenides has escaped these charges, his central message has still been labelled a “single, poor, empty certainty”; a philosophy that is unable to assert anything more than that “existence really exists!” and so on.[14] Now if we remind ourselves that, when viewed from the standpoint of transcendental reality, all oppositions and dualisms are but false seemings (doxa/maya), we see that negation is but a special kind of affirmation.[15] According to the Way of Truth, then, what is really the case when scholars accuse Parmenides of a “single empty certainty” is that they are accusing him of being an inverted nihilist since, again, when viewed from the standpoint of transcendental reality, the road up and the road down is still the same road.
To reach the supra-mundane reality of the One, some form of negation must take place. Whether one takes the positive (Parmenides/Upanishads) or negative (Nagarjuna) way, it is necessary to refute and negate the empirical mind, that is, the Way of Seeming that mortals subscribe to by default.[16] According to the positive route taken by Parmenides, the blanket of falsehood that is thrown over the One must be removed by the “negation” of swelling one’s vision until “all is full of being” (8.25), a method comparable with the teaching of the Tejobindu Upanishad that one must be “looking upon the world as full of Brahman … getting fullness through Brahman … and developing fullness through the means of Brahman.”[17]
REFERENCES
Gerson, L.P.: Aristotle and Other Platonists Cornell University 2005
Jones, R.H.: Philosophy of Mysticism SUNY Press 2016
Murti, T.R.V.: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism Munshiram Monoharlal 2013
Stcherbatsky, F.Th.: Buddhist Logic vol. I Mortilal Banadidas 1930
NOTES
[1] Katha Upanishad 2.1.10
[2] Taittiriya Upanishad 2.7.1
[3] Jones: Philosophy of Mysticism p. 204
[4] Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2.6.3
[5] Cf. Heraclitus DK B101a: “Eyes are better witnesses than ears.”
[6] Note, however, that though the teaching of Nagarjuna has several elements in common with the teaching of Parmenides and the Upanishads, Nagarjuna is a Buddhist and did not teach the One (or Brahman) as the end goal of his dialectic. And contrary to popular belief, nor did he teach emptiness (sunyata). Rather, the zenith of his dialectic is the perfection of transcendent wisdom (prajnaparamita) – a supra-mundane intuition of the real that is beyond all concepts, including the concept of prajnaparamita itself.
[7] Taittiriya Upanishad 2.4, cf. Heraclitus DK B93: “The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither reveals nor conceals, but gives a sign.”
[8] Exactly how much Parmenides comes back to “destroy the net” is up for debate. Certainly, he is nowhere near as comprehensive as Nagarjuna and some might even object that the nature of Parmenides’ thought is much more spontaneous, histrionic, and unselfconscious than my exposition makes it out to be. As will become clear in the course of this study, I would not object to such a characterization. I aim to show both the truth in Parmenides’ teaching, but also (in turn) its incompleteness or relative lack of sophistication compared to other thinkers who carried many of his themes further. See however Parmenides (8.53; 9.1; 19.4) for a basic (and recurring) critique of how naming (i.e. language and concepts) causes Seeming. This observation is lent further weight when cross-referenced with Parmenides’ avoidance concerning the subject for being (as we have already seen). For an Indian parallel, see also Mundaka Upanishad 1.1.9 about how the process of naming makes One appear as many, or the Katha Upanishad 2.3.12 about the impossibility of realizing the One through language and words.
[9] Katha Upanishad 2.1.10-11, cf. Isha Upanishad 5. Compare also Parmenides (8.23-5) with the dedicatory verse of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: “All this is full. All that is full. / Out of fullness, fullness comes…” Some might also be tempted to posit Heraclitus DK B60 (“Road up, road down, it is still the same road”) and Heraclitus DK B103 (“The beginning and end on a circle are common”) as parallels here, but in my estimation this would not be accurate, since Heraclitus did not attempt to completely transcend the differentiated elements of reality, but only to point out how opposites are interdependent within empirical reality. I will conduct a more elaborate comparison of Heraclitus and Parmenides later in this study.
[10] Atma Upanishad 1.4
[11] Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 234
[12] Mundaka Upanishad 1.2.8 and Heraclitus DK B108: “Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all,” as well as DK B40: “Much learning does not teach understanding, or else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataios.”
[13] Tejobindu Upanishad 1.46, cf. Nagarjuna: Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way XIII.8. Something similar appears to have been true of the Neoplatonists of antiquity as when, for example, the great Plato scholar Longinus was chided by Porphyry for being merely a scholar and having failed to absorb the supra-mundane wisdom contained in the master’s philosophy. See Gerson: Aristotle and Other Platonists p. 12n37.
[14] Nietzsche: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks §11
[15] Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic vol. I p. 116
[16] As I have argued throughout this study, Parmenides takes the positive route to Truth, comparable to that of the Upanishads where everything is “full of being” (8.25), e.g. Tejobindu Upanishad 1.29; 1.42-3: “Looking upon the world as full of Brahman … getting fullness through Brahman … and developing fullness through the means of Brahman.”
[17] Tejobindu Upanishad 1.29; 1.42-3