By Eva Gregersen
In spite of the previous essays offered on this site, as well as the essays of Jung and von Franz, there are still people who argue that the inferior function is just like the other three functions, just less well-developed. However, as we have previously argued, such a conception is Aristotelian, not Jungian. It may make sense to some people in relation to their personal rendition of typology, of course. But it does not square with the psychodynamic framework in which the theory of types was conceived. In other words, the common (but non-psychodynamic) view is to regard the lower functions as less differentiated, but otherwise essentially the same in nature as the dominant function. The logical consequence of this view is that the inferior function can thus be “developed” just like the other three functions. But as we shall see, that is not what Jung and von Franz thought.
With regard to the inferior function, it is our contention (along with Jung and von Franz) that it cannot be developed as an act of conscious volition, owing to the fact that the inferior function resides chiefly in the unconscious.[1] According to the psychodynamic view of the functions, the more a person’s consciousness gravitates towards experiencing the world through the filter of his or her dominant function, the more that person’s consciousness will polarize away from that function’s opposite, thus pushing the inferior function further and further away from consciousness. Simply put, this means that the person cannot resolve to “pull up” his or her inferior function to consciousness in the way that so many internet authors seem to imply. Indeed, as von Franz has said, the repressed function “is a horse that cannot be educated. … You can never rule or educate it and make it act as you would like, but if you are very clever and are willing to give in a lot, then you may be able to arrange so that it does not throw you.”[2]
According to Jung and von Franz, the psychic economy of the functions is such that when a phenomenon takes place that might in theory be more practically handled by a person’s inferior function, rather than attempting to “access” the unconscious, the psyche will defer to the dominant function instead. Thus the dominant function often falsifies the inferior. Rather than facing the hassle of attempting to force the inferior function to come to the forefront of consciousness, the most differentiated function will try to do the job of the least differentiated function instead. This is why, in our portrait of the late author and polemicist Christopher Hitchens, we say that with Hitchens it was as if he tried to let the brain be the muscle – i.e. to let Ni fill in for Se. A similar example, given by Jung himself, could be the way Nietzsche wrote intellectually about the Overman, while ostensibly being quite timid and polite in person (at least according to reports). In Jung’s view, Ni falsified Se for Nietzsche, and his portrait of the Overman “was written [out of his] unconscious and is a picture of what a man should be.”[3] If Nietzsche had not repressed Se, there would be no need to write up this compensatory alter ego – he would have simply left his study and ventured out to be the Overman, rather than theorizing about it.
NOTES
[1] Von Franz: Lectures on Jung’s Typology (Spring Publications 1984) p. 7
[2] Von Franz: Lectures on Jung’s Typology (Spring Publications 1984) p. 19, cf. von Franz: Psychotherapy (Shambhala 1993) p. 51, 53
[3] Jung: Introduction to Jungian Psychology (Princeton University Press 2011) p. 7