By Ryan Smith
The Indian philosopher Shankara’s (788 – 820 CE) criticism of Yogacara, the ‘mind only’ school of idealist Buddhism, may warrant closer attention.
Yogacara as Ni
As we have previously covered on the site, the third phase of Buddhist philosophy, the idealist Yogacara school, posited that only consciousness is real. What appears to us as objects is really just consciousness playing with itself, as in the case of a dream. There are no objects, only the various whims or ‘moods’ of consciousness that wax and wane, causing us to believe that there are objects and factual realities “out there,” when there is really only consciousness.
Building upon the basic arguments posited by Nagarjuna,[1] the Yogacara school proceeds to form its own philosophy of “consciousness only” by modifying Nagarjuna’s teachings as follows (if you are not familiar with the arguments of Nagarjuna, read this article first):
- Objects are clearly not simply atoms, which are passively and loyally rendered as they are by the psyche. Consciousness modifies the real, making the whole appear as distinct objects with space-time properties.
- The existence of ‘objects’ apart from the existence of a discriminating consciousness is untenable, because without discrimination there would only be the indefinable whole. But wherever there is consciousness, the impression that there is knowledge invariably follows. Idealism must therefore be primordial; materialism acquired.
- Consciousness can exist without an object (e.g. in dreams). Consciousness is the ‘core’ which cannot be stripped from psychic life. It is a self-revealed ‘given’ that precedes any argument or observation.
- There is an inner dynamism in consciousness and it is by the unfolding of this dynamism that the different states and objects appear to consciousness even though in truth there is only pure consciousness, devoid of objects or states (as in a blissful trance).
All of these arguments may with some modification be accepted as indicative of how pure Ni works. It is not contended that Ni types necessarily have this knowledge or self-insight themselves, by virtue of being Ni types. The arguments are rather provided to show the psychogenic nature of Ni, bringing its subjective consciousness to bear upon objective realities and subordinating them to its internal psychic drawing board (Psychological Types §656).
As long as a subject is purely conceptual and reflective – being contained in consciousness without having to abide by the physical world – that problem is aesthetic and uplifting; the Ni type has a sensation that he is in control. It is when the idealized contents of subjective consciousness clash with objective realities that the Ni type begins to experience the subject matter as a problem (Psychological Types §658). It is therefore natural for the Ni type to gravitate towards a ‘consciousness only’ approach which moves the elements of an issue away from outer reality and into subjective consciousness, thereby catering to his natural strong suits and fostering in him a feeling of empowerment.[2]
Vedanta as Fi/Te
Another point which we have previously covered on the site is that the Vedanta school of Indian philosophy has a strand of Fi/Te biases in its metaphysics. The Indian philosopher Shankara, who was himself an adherent and reformer of the Vedanta school, objected to Yogacara on the following grounds:
- Objects cannot be denied; they are present in every act of empirical knowledge.
- It does not make sense to take the cognizing act to be the true root of the object cognized because the nature of cognition is to reveal what is present (as far as it is capable of doing) and not to create content out of nothing.
- If there are no objects, and no reality besides consciousness, then there is really no distinction between dream and reality. Hence, according to the Yogacara school’s own arguments, all of cognition must be a kind of extended dream and (like in the philosophy of Hegel) everything that is perceived as true in consciousness must therefore also be true. No impartial distinction between truth and falsehood can be reached; the standard of truth is solely determined on the basis of what the Ni type perceives to be agreeable to his vision (which is perhaps another reason for the link between Ni types and Narcissism).
Because of Shankara’s arguments against Yogacara, some Western commentators mistake him for a full-blooded empiricist, positing naked Te-style refutations to correct the subjective excesses of Ni. However, as a species of absolutist philosophy, Vedanta cannot be identified with merely one point on a function axis (Te or Fi) but is synonymous with the function axis as a whole (Te and Fi).
Thus, when faced with the purely subjective arguments of Ni, Shankara corrects the bias by use of objective Te-style arguments. Yet if another party were to confront him with Te-style arguments as an end in itself, Shankara would falsify the objective excesses of Te by seeking refuge in Fi-style arguments instead.
Shankara is after all an absolutist. He believes that the true object of reality cannot be adequately predicated by empirical consciousness. Though partially true, empirical determinations cannot do ultimate justice to the real. In every experience there is the ineffable essence of a thing which escapes us. It cannot be contained in thought-categories, only known intimately and first-hand, that is to say, subjectively. But unlike Ni and Yogacara, true knowledge must come without denying the validity of the viewpoints of others.
The empirical world is real, but as an other that can never be possessed. The knower can only reveal and discover the other – never define or compel him. As the quotation attributed to the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard goes, “When you label me, you negate me.” Shankara is here in agreement with Kierkegaard: The ideal of knowledge is to know the other as he is in his own subjectivity, untainted by the thought-categories and purposes that others would apply to him. Only knowledge of the other in his pure state can qualify as knowledge at all. Only the unforced and undetermined being of the other is pure.
Postscript: Functions and Function Axes
In this article, the philosophy of Yogacara has been examined through Shankara’s criticism. Ni has taken a shellacking at the hands of Te and Fi. However, it is important to note that the reason this has been so is because the Yogacara philosophy represents a one-sided indulgence in Ni to the exclusion of Se. Had it been Vedanta that had engaged one-sidedly in either Te or Fi while Yogacara represented a philosophy that was synonymous with the Ni/Se axis as a whole, the tables would have been turned and the matter would have been inverted. In other words, the criticisms borne out in this article do not pertain to any function, but to the failure to admit the whole of a function axis into analysis.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Professor T.R.V. Murti for his discussions of the Shankara / Yogacara dispute.
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Image of Shankara instructing his disciples commissioned for this publication from artist Francesca Elettra.
NOTES
[1] In the difference between Yogacara and Nagarjuna, where Yogacara represents Ni and Nagarjuna Ti, the two schools agree that the subject-object distinction (as well as all other distinctions) are really void – marked by emptiness, as Nagarjuna would say. The difference is that while Nagarjuna would say that everything is marked by emptiness, Yogacara posits that everything except for consciousness is marked by emptiness, while consciousness itself is real. The position of Yogacara can be illustrated by analogy: It corresponds to saying that everything about a painting is illusory, except for the canvas, which itself is real and content-less. By contrast, Nagarjuna and his followers would maintain that even the canvas is not real, since there are no objects or entities which can be defined as distinct from the whole.
[2] Though Ni types are psychological idealists, sometimes even solipsists, they are not necessarily philosophical idealists. Indeed, it appears to be a frequent paradox that many INTJs are philosophical materialists/physicalists while failing to recognize how these philosophies represent metaphysical biases formed in part by their mind’s desire, and not merely by objective data and fact.