By Ryan Smith
I once knew an INTJ. He was amongst the five best people I’ve ever known when it comes to determining other people’s types. For the most part, we were in complete agreement as to people’s types, but once in a while, in complex or atypical cases, we disagreed on how to operationalize or interpret Jung’s typology, and we ended up having heated arguments.
The reason we could never resolve these arguments, I now see, is that Jungian typology has a Platonic bias. Yet my friend, being an empiricist, could not accept the otherworldly or purely deductive principles of Jungian typology. He was an Aristotelian, so to speak – he wanted Jungian typology to make sense in conjunction with science as a whole. He was convinced that typology could be operationalized in a way that would make it empirically valid.
Unfortunately, I do not speak to him anymore. Yet before we parted ways, I promised that I would one day write down his principles for determining psychological type so that others might read them. Since we are not on speaking terms, I should probably avoid mentioning his name, and so I will call him Aristotle.
First Axiom: The Determinant of Type is the Cognitive Functions, not the Four-letter Codes.
The first axiom should hardly be controversial. Only Keirsey and his progeny seem to reject the cognitive functions.[1] The Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions of typology are thus in agreement here: The four-letter codes are no more than shorthands for a specific arrangement of functions, e.g. INFP is no more than a shorthand for “Fi-Ne-Si-Te.”
Since we are only interested in functions, there is no such thing as “being an F.” Such generalizing statements should always be qualified by their orientation. Thus, you can be an Fe or an Fi type. But under the Aristotelian conception of typology, it is meaningless to say that “so-and-so is an F.” We all have an F function. The difference is one of assignment (first, second, third, or fourth function) and orientation (Fe or Fi).
As mentioned, approaching typology through the functions rather than through the four-letter codes is hardly controversial. But the Aristotelian conception introduces another twist.
Second Axiom: If divided into pairs, the types that are the most alike are the types that share the same two uppermost functions, not the types that share a dominant function.
With the second axiom we break away from Jung, von Franz, Myers (and Plato if he had been alive to take sides in the dispute).[2] The classical type theoreticians all posited that, if divided into pairs, the types that are the most alike will be the types that share the same dominant function. But my Aristotelian friend follows Keirsey and begs to differ.
The question of which type pairs that have the most in common is thus divided as follows:
|
Keirsey, |
Jung, von Franz, |
|
STP |
ESP |
As I said, my friend’s second axiom is really the same as Keirsey’s as featured in Please Understand Me II. So you can say that Keirsey already beat my friend to the realization.[3] In my opinion, “Aristotle” and Keirsey are correct in positing that, in practice, the types in their type pairs resemble each other more closely than the ones posited by Jung, Myers, and von Franz. The groupings positioned on the Platonic side must thus be considered dated or suboptimal with regards to the practical application of typology in the world.[4]
Third Axiom: The Pareto Principle Applies: A person’s two uppermost functions will be active 80% of the time and a person’s two lowermost functions will be active 20% of the time.
With the third axiom, things are really getting serious with regards to deviating from the Platonic mold. A strong case could probably be made for saying that if Jung, von Franz, and Myers were dabbling in typology from the vantage point of our current state of knowledge (instead of having to invent it from scratch), they would have grouped the types into pairs that were identical to those of Keirsey and Aristotle.
However, one cannot argue that Jung and his progeny would ever have thought that something like the Pareto Principle was a suitable way of determining the functions: To Aristotle, the relevant descriptor of whether a function belongs to the superior two (dominant and auxiliary) or to the inferior two (tertiary and inferior) is chiefly whether that function is frequently active in the person’s cognition (80% of the time) or whether it is one that is used more seldom (20% of the time). It is, in other words, a question of quantity.
To Aristotle, the functions are like four light bulbs of decreasing luminescence. But the psyche only has enough “power” to switch two of them on at any given time. To Jung, on the other hand, the constellation of the four functions is more like a snake: The snake may be broader at its head than at its tail, and the snake may have a better control of itself at its head than it does at its tail. But when the snake moves, all of it moves. To Jung, the functions imply and influence each other. The more an Ni type wriggles his Ni, the more he also wriggles his Se: The more differentiated his Ni becomes, the more primitive and unconscious his Se becomes.
Aristotle agrees with Jung that the functions imply each other insofar as Ni will always imply Se as its opposite and never some other function. But Aristotle discards the line of reasoning that the interplay of the functions is unquantifiable once unconscious compensation is factored in. As such, Aristotle’s conception of Jungian typology does away with the psychodynamic approach that is the larger methodical foundation of Jung, von Franz, and van der Hoop’s entire mode of thinking.
To explain the difference between the psychodynamic view of typology, which hinges upon quality rather than quantity, let me give three examples of how Jung, von Franz, and van der Hoop thought about typology:
1: To give an example of what a psychodynamic approach to typology implies, one might look at the inferior function: According to the psychodynamic approach to determining type, the inferior function will, as a rule, be repressed from consciousness.[5] In the words of von Franz, one cannot choose to pull one’s inferior function up into consciousness just because one thinks that it would be fun or convenient to do so.[6] Therefore, according to the psychodynamic view of the functions, the inferior function will exert a so-called return of the repressed, meaning that most types will be subject to an element of unconscious influence that stems specifically from the pull of the inferior function.
For example, the INJ types (who repress Se) will be “terribly immoderate” with regards to sex, sugar, alcohol and the like.[7] Likewise, the EFJ types (who repress Ti) will tend to skirt impartiality like the plague, as such a stance towards others tends to get in the way of the mutuality and emotional warmth that the Fe types so heartily desire in their interaction with others.
2: For another example of an assumption that springs from the psychodynamic approach to typology, we may look at the fact that certain characteristics are assumed to manifest themselves in the whole type on the basis of whatever function is the dominant function. To Jung and von Franz, it would make a very great difference what one’s dominant function is. For example, whether a person is an INTJ (and therefore an N-dominant type) or an ENTJ (and therefore a T-dominant type) would be hugely important to Jung and von Franz. In their view, the ENTJ could easily be discerned from the INTJ because the psychodynamic view makes the assumption that the T-dominant type will be more satisfied with rearranging existing knowledge whereas the N-dominant type would have much less of an appetite for dedicating himself to the study of knowledge that was already settled and formalized.[8]
As a result, the ENTJ will more often have a broader array of more secure knowledge, whereas the INTJ will possess an array of knowledge that is more specialized and less certain than the ENTJ’s. As an Intuitive type, the INTJ’s knowledge will also have a more personal, even mystical, element to it when compared to that of the Thinking type.[9]
According to the psychodynamic view of typology, the reason there is such a wide difference between the two types (even though there is seemingly only a difference of extroversion) is because the Intuitive types are generally motivated by breaking new ground (Ne/Ni) while the Thinking types are more often motivated by optimizing or clarifying existing fields of knowledge (Te/Ti).
3: Here is a third example of the psychodynamic viewpoint: Since the T-dominant types repress their Feeling function, they are able to move about the contents of their knowledge and assumptions in a dispassionate manner, whereas the N-dominant types will have a personal stake in their knowledge. The N-dominant types will, in a sense, live for stimulating mental imagery, whereas the T-dominant types live rather for secure mental constructs which lead to finalized and enduring verdicts. N-types are thus more at ease when new waters are being charted, and T-types are thus more at ease when everything has been organized (Te) or clarified (Ti).
Now that these three examples of the orthodox Jungian mode of operationalizing typology have been given, I will return to Aristotle’s disagreement with the psychodynamic mode of thinking.
As mentioned, Aristotle’s method rejects the assumption that there are specific implications for the psyche that are woven into each function slot (e.g. that the inferior function will necessarily pose a special problem for the individual, or that the difference between N dominance or T dominance in an NT type will really mean so much). Aristotle’s rationale for rejecting these assumptions is not, however, that he rejects the possibility of there being truth to them, but rather that they are too hard to validate empirically. The Aristotelian critique is therefore the equivalent of saying that the Platonic or psychodynamic way of approaching Jung’s typology leaves too much up to the personal whims of the person who sets out to determine the psychological type of others. The observer becomes, in effect, an interpreter, and that makes the entire system too shaky for Aristotelian tastes.
The Aristotelians have a very powerful card up their sleeve that they can use to challenge the Platonists: Sometimes, albeit only rarely, the psychodynamic approach leads to awkward assessments, such as in the case of Bill Gates: Observing Bill Gates, we see a man who takes little pleasure in socializing, who enjoys reading in solitude for days on end, and who in many other ways appears to behave as an introvert. Yet the man has often been typed as an extrovert. In these cases, the Platonist appears to disregard the immediate data that comes to our senses, fleeing into the ideal construct of ideas and forms that apply to consciousness instead of behavior. He braces himself and chants the Platonist credo: “Direct observation cannot be relied upon – the world of the senses is a falsehood – direct observation of the person cannot be depended upon – what really animates a person is the underlying ‘true forms’ (i.e. functions) which do not manifest in behavior but have to be discerned by the mind.”[10]
It may sound like a parody, but the Platonic approach to typology is really quite consonant with how Jung preferred to approach his typology.[11] It is, however, also at odds with the scientific method and thus bound to dissatisfy Aristotelians of every stripe.
Even without its empiricist orientation, Te likes to base its assertions on commonly accepted standards and ideas (which is really one of the reasons for its efficiency and the ease with which Te types can dominate others). And as we all know, Plato and common sense do not mix.[12] Put yourself in the shoes of the newcomer: Does Bill Gates appear extroverted to you?
By shifting the emphasis from interpretation and inference (the psychodynamic approach) to direct observation (the empirical approach), Aristotle purposes to lift Jungian typology out of its Platonic origins and onto a framework that is congruent with direct observation. The practical consequences of this change become apparent below.
Derivative of the Axioms: As a consequence of the above axioms, whether a person is extroverted or introverted will have little importance with regards to his intellectual output.
If we assume, for the sake of illustration, that Plato was an NFJ type, then the obvious assessment, according to the psychodynamic view, would be that Plato must have been an INFJ because he makes conscious use of Ti while similarly making a show of renouncing the natural domain of Se.
However, since the Aristotelian mode of thinking rejects the notion that there are specific psychological properties connected to each of the function slots and favors the 80/20 rule instead, it does not accept the arguments given above as legitimate indicators that Plato was INFJ rather than ENFJ. Without direct testimonies about Plato’s behavior, indicating either sociability or reserve, Aristotle maintains that Plato could just as well be ENFJ as INFJ.
Likewise, if Bill Gates’s behavior appears to indicate reserve, he is therefore an introvert in Aristotle’s view. Again, this is in opposition to the Jungian or Platonic view, which would examine Gates’ consciousness for cues on his dominant and inferior functions in order to ascertain the whole type, just as a Jungian could ascertain Plato’s whole type from the nature of his intellectual output. And insofar as Fi seems to be repressed into the unconscious, that means that Bill Gates is an ENTJ, even if direct and immediate observation seems to say otherwise.[13]
Again, the Aristotelian approach has no patience for such intricacies: If direct observation of the man’s behavior seems to indicate that he is an introvert, then he is an introvert.
Assessment of an Aristotelian Approach to Type
The field of Jungian typology was born out of the psychodynamic approach, and while exact definitions and the function orders were not worked out from the get-go, the field had always seemed to rely on the cognitive functions rather than on the basic eight letters (E, F, J, etc.). What Keirsey did was to create his own approach where he:
- Discarded the notion of cognitive functions, reverting instead to typing by way of the eight basic letters.
- Exchanged Jung’s psychodynamic approach for a behavioristic approach where he took a person’s outward behavior as the actual determinant of type.
What the Aristotelian approach brings to Jungian typology, then, is a serviceable synthesis: Like Jung and his progeny, the Aristotelian approach retains a focus on the cognitive functions (as opposed to Keirsey’s focus on the four-letter codes). But like Keirsey and his progeny, the Aristotelian approach attempts to decode a person’s type on the basis of directly observable, actual outward behavior.
On the whole, then, the Aristotelian approach is more in line with empirical observation while at the same time being a lot less simplistic than Keirsey’s. On the other hand, though, there is a great deal of conceptual richness and philosophical nuance that is stripped from the system if one adopts the Aristotelian approach.
REFERENCES
Jacobi: The Psychology of C.G. Jung Routledge 1969
Jung: Psychological Types Harcourt and Brace 1923
Keirsey & Bates: Please Understand Me Prometheus 1984
Keirsey: Please Understand Me II Prometheus 1998
McGuire & Hull: C.G. Jung Speaking Princeton University Press 1977
Nietzsche: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Regenary Publishing 1996
Russell: History of Western Philosophy Routledge 2004
Van der Hoop: Character and the Unconscious Kessinger Publishing 2010
Von Franz & Hillman: Lectures on Jung’s Typology Spring Publications 1971
NOTES
[1] Keirsey & Bates: Please Understand Me p. 27
[2] Van der Hoop cannot be said to have taken sides in this matter. In his books, he follows the Jungian schema of grouping types together according to their dominant function (e.g. ETJ, ENP, etc.) but he frequently prefaces his presentations with disclaimers such as “it will make a great difference if a Te type has intuition or sensation as his auxiliary function.” See: Van der Hoop: Character and the Unconscious p. 168
[3] Keirsey: Please Understand Me II p. 110
[4] In my experience, people that come to the field with an open mind and no idealistic preconceptions will readily observe that an ESTJ is, by and large, closer to an ISTJ (as Aristotle and Keirsey would say) than he is to an ENTJ (as Jung, von Franz, and Myers would say). This is not a matter of black and white, though. Of course there are areas where an ESTJ will be closer to an ENTJ than to an ISTJ. But on the whole, it seems to me that Keirsey and Aristotle are correct that an ESTJ and an ISTJ tend to have more in common with each other than an ESTJ has with an ENTJ.
[5] Jacobi: The Psychology of C.G. Jung p. 13
[6] Von Franz: Lectures on Jung’s Typology pp. 17-18
[7] Von Franz: Lectures on Jung’s Typology pp. 33-34, cf. pp. 45-46
[8] Van der Hoop: Conscious Orientation p. 266, cf. Nietzsche: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks pp. 40-41
[9] McGuire & Hull (eds.): C.G. Jung Speaking p. 313 “In the end, the Intuitive has seen something that nobody else has seen.”
[10] Plato: The Republic: Book VII, 514a- 521d
[11] McGuire & Hull (eds.): C.G. Jung Speaking p. 412
[12] Russell: History of Western Philosophy §1.2.19
[13] What does it look like when Fi is pushed into the background? Jung gives the answer: “Irrational forms, such as religious experiences, passions and the like, are often obliterated even to the point of complete unconsciousness.” And further: “Doubtless there are … men who are able to sacrifice their entire life to one definite formula; but for most of us a permanent life of such exclusiveness is impossible.” Both quotations are from Jung: Psychological Types [1923 edition] p. 437 Likewise: “Should the repression [of Fi] succeed, it … runs counter to conscious aims, even producing effects whose causation is a complete enigma to the individual. For example, conscious altruism, often of an extremely high order, may be crossed by a secret self-seeking, of which the individual is wholly unaware, and which impresses intrinsically unselfish actions with the stamp of selfishness.” Jung: Psychological Types [1923 edition] p. 437
So a penchant for altruism or philanthropic work might serve as a “typical” example of the pull of inferior Fi in the Te dominant’s psyche. The reason there is “a secret self-seeking” in ETJs is because the repressed function is Fi (and not some other function) – Fi seeking, above all, to be true to itself.
***
Image of Aristotle in the article commissioned from artist Francesca Elettra.