Function Biases in Buddhism and Vedanta

By Ryan Smith

The spiritual history of India can be divided into two main strands:  The Atman (self) and the Anatman (no-self) traditions. The self-doctrine draws its inspiration from the spiritual visions of the Vedic seers, as these were handed down to us in the Upanishads (ca. 1000 – 500 BCE) while the no-self doctrine is derived from the teachings of Gautama Buddha (ca. 550 – 400 BCE).

Vedanta forms one of the basic schools of Hindu philosophy and is commonly identified with what we call “Hinduism” in the West. The teachings of the Buddha were the original seed that gave rise to the religion later known as Buddhism.

For Westerners it would perhaps be more straightforward to think of this article as exploring the functional biases of Buddhism and Hinduism (rather than of Buddhism and Vedanta) but to do so would be imprecise: What we call “Hinduism” is really a heterogeneous quilt of creeds and beliefs and not every patch on the quilt is directly in touch with Vedanta. And while our title names “Buddhism” as a whole, our focus here shall be on the teachings of Gautama Buddha himself, as well as on those of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (ca. 150 – 250 CE).

Similarities of Buddhism and Vedanta

To both Buddhism and Vedanta, realizing the absolute is the highest goal that the individual can attain in his life. The whole purpose of these philosophies is really to enable the individual to realize the absolute; it is a realization of the ineffable and cannot be expressed in language or learned in the manner in which we normally acquaint ourselves with other kinds of knowledge.

In Western philosophy, two counterparts to the Indian conception of the absolute are found in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. Kant had argued that the absolute exists but that the human mind is wholly unable to comprehend it. Hegel, for his part, agreed that the absolute exists, but asserted that he could understand it through the use of human reason.

In the case of Buddhism and Vedanta, both of these philosophies agree with Hegel that it is possible for the human mind to realize the absolute, but they agree with Kant that the absolute is beyond ordinary human thought. The relationship between the four of them may thus be summarized as follows:

Buddhists and Vedantins each assert that the absolute cannot be realized by means of ordinary human consciousness. What they mean is that a supra-mundane state of consciousness is required to comprehend the absolute – a state of mind that can only be reached through meditation.

According to Buddhism, Vedanta, and Kant, the absolute is transcendent to the categories of thought. It is beyond empirical phenomena and cannot be adequately expressed in the same manner that one can express ordinary ideas. Nevertheless, both Buddhists and Vedantins have some distinct ideas about the nature of the absolute and contrary to what it is fashionable for “spiritual teachers” to claim today, these ideas are not in agreement.

Having delineated the farthest contours of the philosophical ball court shared by Buddhism and Vedanta, we will now look at three fundamental differences in their conceptions of the absolute.

Difference #1: The Absolute and Self

Perhaps the most essential difference between the two philosophies is that the Vedic seers identified the absolute with the self. Hence, one of the “grand pronouncements” of Vedanta is that “you are that.”[1] The original, pure, and primordial state – the absolute that is beyond ordinary thought-categories and the true source of the world is none other than you. This absolute entity, called Brahman, is identified with the deepest essence of the human soul. In Vedanta, the aspirant must practice to realize that the absolute is none other than the self in its supreme form.

By contrast, one of the Buddha’s most well-known teachings is that there is no transcendental self. While the Vedantins had said that Atman is Brahman, i.e. that the soul is the absolute, the Buddha searched himself in meditation and concluded that no part of the psyche could be said to be the self. In the analysis employed by early Buddhists, the human being is often likened to a lifeless object, such as a chariot: When you see a chariot, the combination of wheels, chassis, reins, and yoke deceives you into thinking that the chariot must have some kind of chariot-essence, when in fact it is just a combination of individual parts.[2] In the same way, according to the earliest Buddhist scriptures, the coexistence of sense, body, thoughts, and consciousness makes you think that there must be some kind of human-essence when in fact, there is no human-essence at all. The human being, like the chariot, is just a collection of parts.

Difference #2: The Absolute and Object

Secondly, in Vedanta, the absolute is conceived as object or entity. While the absolute entity cannot be described, it can nevertheless still be hinted at in parables and analogies. In Vedanta, the absolute object (Brahman) is the primordial object that is beyond all other objects. The world is rooted in Brahman and Brahman is the root out of which everything grows.[3] Everything that exists draws its existence from this primordial entity that stands alone and unconditioned, as a substratum to the ordinary world.

As an independent entity, the absolute also has qualities of its own: It is supreme, peaceful, immortal, all-encompassing, and all-knowing. By the exposition of its qualities, the absolute is established to be superior to other objects, “swifter than all, brighter than all, more immaculate than all.”[4] The absolute possesses the same essential qualities as ordinary objects but has them in such supreme abundance that they are incomprehensible to ordinary consciousness.[5] A hierarchy between the absolute and other objects is established with all other objects subservient to the absolute.

According to the earliest Buddhist sources, the Buddha denied that there was any such Brahman-object, though he did not deny the existence of the absolute.[6] However, the Buddha and his early followers left the question of the absolute unresolved.

The most influential philosophical response to the loose ends left by the Buddha was produced by Nagarjuna some 600 years after the Buddha’s original teachings. While the Buddha had said that there was no selfhood, only composite objects, Nagarjuna took that analysis further and said that not even the tiniest parts of composite objects exist. For example, if the Buddha would say that there is no cup, only a bunch of modes and conditions that have come together to take the shape of a cup, Nagarjuna would press on to say that not even the “modes and conditions” exist as separate entities that can be separated from the rest of the cosmos. To use a modern analogy, the Buddha would consider the atoms that make up a cup to be real, but the cup itself to be unreal.[7] According to Nagarjuna, however, neither the cup nor the atoms are real: To define an atom you would have to delineate it and thereby make reference to something outside of it that is not the atom.[8] By Nagarjuna’s reasoning, this mutual interdependence between atom and not-atom extends to every conceivable object in the universe. This means that there are no objects and that qualities and attributes such as whole and part, self, and other are really not applicable to the absolute.[9] Every conceivable thing is self-transcending and therefore cannot be conceived as an object.

To Nagarjuna, the absolute is simply the real, perceived without division or thought-categories. The absolute is not an object, since delineating it as object would cut the perceiver off from the undivided apprehension of the absolute.

Where the Vedantins had said that this world is rooted in the absolute and grows out of it as a plant from a root, Nagarjuna contends that the absolute is nothing other than the totality of this world, perceived without distinction.[10]

• The Vedantins thus perceive the absolute as object; Nagarjuna perceives it as non-object.
• The Vedantins assert that the absolute is an independent entity that causes this world; Nagarjuna contends that the absolute is nothing other than this world.
• The Vedantins suggest that this world is subservient to the absolute; Nagarjuna advances the view that this world and the absolute are completely interdependent and interpenetrating; there can be no hierarchy between them.

Difference #3: The Absolute and Substance

Finally, it is a common assertion of the Vedantins that the absolute is imbued with substance. The absolute, being identified with Atman and Brahman, stands alone as a single thing that gives all of the phenomenal world existence by feeding it parts of its essence. Everything that has existence has been lent a sliver of being from the ultimate Being of Brahman.[11] For example, in the Chandogya Upanishad we are told that Brahman is like the element of gold itself, from which all golden objects are made.[12] If there was no element of gold, there would be no golden objects in the world; if there was no absolute object which possessed absolute Being, there would be no lesser objects either. Absolute Brahman-Atman is the primordial substance out of which the world is made.

This substance view of the absolute that is conveyed in the Upanishads is older than Buddhism. When the Buddha came of age, he rebelled against it. In the Buddha’s teachings, the real is determined by relations and processes, not by substance. There is no substance, nor essence – only causation and modes determine the nature of the real. The real is conceived as a stream, not an object or substance.[13] Applied to the absolute, this ontology likely entails that the Buddha would regard the absolute as devoid of substance. For Nagarjuna’s part, he would assert that neither substance nor non-substance is applicable to the absolute (as no human concepts are in his view).

Vedanta Whatness vs. Buddhist Howness

We are now in a position to take stock of the absolute as conceived by both the Buddhists and the Vedantins. Inspired by the Buddhist scholar Garma C.C. Chang, we might say that Vedanta seizes on the “whatness” of the absolute while Buddhism seizes on the “howness”:[14] The Vedantin affirms that the absolute exists as Brahman while ignoring the modes of its existence – it simply is and that is-ness is so plentiful that there is no need to inquire about its modes.

The Buddhist, for his part, assures us that he has searched everywhere for a lasting substance and found none. He knows that the absolute exists as suchness or thusness – the immanence of the absolute, being simply “thus,” is so intense that any attempt to determine its nature is dismissed as redundant.

Function Biases in Buddhism and Vedanta

In my opinion, across all of the parameters examined, the Vedanta view resembles an ontology that flows more naturally from an Fi/Te psyche, while the Buddhist view coincides with an ontology that more naturally arises in the psyche of an Fe/Ti type.

However, the premise of my argument goes beyond the findings of previous writers and may readily be challenged. I therefore present my premises, so that the reader can decide whether or not he agrees with them. They are:

1. All else being equal, an Fi/Te type is more likely to regard the self and one’s personal identity as an ontological entity of primary importance. An Fi/Te type is more likely to say that “I’m me and you are you,” whereas an Fe/Ti type is more likely to believe that “we’re all one, all cut from the same cloth.” See also here.
2. All else being equal, the ontology of an Fi/Te type is more likely to consist of distinct objects and entities, whereas an Fe/Ti type is more likely to believe that objects blend into each other. The Fi/Te ontology resembles peas in a pod; the Fe/Ti ontology that of an ocean.  See also here.
3. All else being equal, an Fi/Te type is more likely to subscribe to some sort of materialist or substance metaphysics, while an Fe/Ti type is more likely to be a non-materialist. See also here.

To be clear, I am not saying that the functions themselves determine a person’s viewpoint – that would be an error. Rather, I am saying that some viewpoints flow more naturally from certain function axes than others. This approach is itself in line with how Jung approached the matter in Psychological Types.

It should hopefully be obvious how these three premises tie into the findings above: Fi/Te types tend to attach great importance to the personal self; so do the Vedantins. Fi/Te types tend to view the world as consisting of distinct objects and entities; so do the Vedantins. Fi/Te types are more likely to take a materialist worldview for granted; so are the Vedantins. And one could make a similar list for Fe/Ti types, comparing them to the Buddhists.

What I want to do instead is to call attention to how the functions themselves represent undue and self-serving biases and how, as means of psychic adaptation, they are just as “bad” as they are “good.” Naturally, one could say this of all the eight functions and not just of the four mentioned here. My point is not to say that some functions are better than others, but rather to show that every function represents both a strength and a weakness. Today, Jungian typology products are often marketed as helping you “find your strengths.” But that is only half the story. For every ‘yes,’ there is a ‘no.’ For every plus, there is a minus. All of the functions represent adaptations and biases leading the individual away from the absolute.

Premise 1: Self or No Self?

• Vedanta: If the Brahman is the true self and Brahman is universal, then what about all the other human beings on this earth who presumably also have a self? They must be Brahman too. Yet, if we’re all Brahman, what kind of self is it really? It is certainly not a personal self, since we all share it. – Is this identification of the personal self with the absolute not the Fi type’s infantile need to be special and unique?
• Buddhism: If the self does not exist, then who attains enlightenment? Who realizes the absolute? Why even practice if it doesn’t bring ‘you’ anything? – Is this not the Fe type’s disingenuous tendency to clothe self-interest in altruism and false modesty?

Premise 2: Distinct Objects or Blurred Interdependence?

• Vedanta: If objects are distinct, then why do they nevertheless interact with each other? Clearly, wood does not simply start to burn without fire; a car cannot drive without gas, and a plane cannot fly without fuel. When fire burns, cars drive, and planes fly, wood, gas, and jet fuel do not remain constant, but evaporate in the process of combustion. Certainly, objects cannot be completely distinct, or they would be unable to transform each other through their mutual interaction. – Is this not the Fi type’s starry-eyed wish to “live and let live” so that their own values may stand apart from the protests and logical criticisms of others?
• Buddhism: If objects are interdependent, then why are there different objects at all? If everything is interdependent, how can you still believe in causation, and uphold cause and effect to be different? If there is no distinction between objects, why is it always the fire that is burning and the wood that is being burned and never the other way around? Clearly there must be some distinction between objects, or wood would indeed be able to burn fire. –  Is this not the Fe type’s proclivity to covertly impose values and sentiments on their surroundings which others may not necessarily share?

Premise 3: Substance or Process?

• Vedanta: “Everything must have being for otherwise it could not be.” Though we are dealing with spiritual and metaphysical matters, everything must still be reduced to tautology and brought into agreement with everyday experience. We see and interact with matter, therefore being must be material. – Is this not the Te type’s parlor trick of making all of his reasoning dependent on common sense, so as to make his conclusions seem “objective”?
• Buddhism: How can you heap such skepticism on substance while visiting none of it upon causation? If there is no substance, what do you envisage causation to affect? If you do not accept matter and substance as the primary determinants of the real, then how do you account for the fact that we see and feel matter? – Is this not the Ti type’s impractical and pedantic hair-splitting; his selective pursuit of his own subjective idea while neglecting to account for that which is taking place right in front of him?

Conclusion: The Personal Type as Problem and Impediment

Interviewer: “Have you concluded what psychological type you are yourself?”
C.G. Jung: “Naturally I have devoted a great deal of attention to that painful question, you know!”[15]

This remark of Jung’s about the type being a “painful question” is often interpreted by type enthusiasts to mean that Jung had difficulties determining his own type. However, when one considers the fact that Jung saw the personal type as a problem, rather than as a source of strength, it becomes obvious that the question is painful by definition.

Jung would no doubt have recoiled from the way in which most people approach the theory of types today: Find out which type you are, find out what types other people are, find out how to “develop your functions,” and then leave it at that. As Jung saw it, such wanton capitalization on the theory of type neglects the fact that it is the responsibility of the individual to individuate himself and to grow beyond the biases presented by the personal type. Only then can a person achieve integrative wholeness.

However, as we have previously covered on the site, no other major writer on typology has followed Jung in this normative approach to typology.[16] The personal type seems something deep-rooted and insurmountable, and examples of people changing types are rare, if they are at all existent. Nor does anyone seem individuated in the sense that he or she seems to be completely beyond types. Empirically, it would seem that Jung was wrong – one cannot change type simply by willing it, or by reading about the problems of type in a book.

This is where philosophies that enable the individual to realize the absolute come into play: By going beyond the empirical, it is possible for the individual to obtain first-hand experience of the unbounded totality of psychic life that lies beyond the functions.

Jungian typology is a system of opposites and Jung’s normative goal was a union and dissolution of those opposites. It is when the individual, in the deepest state of consciousness, reaches the position where he is untroubled by opposites that he realizes the absolute. Just as someone driving a chariot looks down upon the two chariot wheels, so the person who has realized the absolute looks down upon the opposites of the empirical domain – day and night, good and evil, Thinking and Feeling, and all the remainder of the opposites – as being really one.[17]

Having reached the absolute, the individual is freed from the opposites inherent in human nature and attains new insight unbounded by the functions.[18] He is redeemed from the problem of opposites that had hitherto plagued his psychic life and by this process of overcoming, he has finally become one.[19]

***

Images of Aum and Buddha commissioned for this article from artist Francesca Elettra.

NOTES 

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[1] Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.7

[2] The Debate of King Milinda (Bhikkhu Pesala ed.) 1.1

[3] Katha Upanishad 2.6.1

[4] Isha Upanishad 4, 8

[5] The Vedantins were not blind to the fact that in its ultimate aspect, the absolute must be devoid of qualities. For this reason, the Vedantins assert that the absolute has two modes: One, the ultimate aspect in which it has no qualities. The other, the relative aspect where the absolute has taken on attributes to make itself known to mortals. It is in this second mode that the absolute can be said to possess the same qualities as ordinary objects, only superabundantly so. Though metaphysically different, the Vedanta doctrine of the two modes is phenomenologically equivalent to the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths.

[6] Udana 80

[7] This is an imprecise analogy, as the Buddha did not believe in atoms or matter as such, but rather in relations and causes (dharmas). But the analogy is often helpful to Western audiences.

[8] Nagarjuna: Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way XIV.5

[9] Nagarjuna: Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way XXII.3

[10] Nagarjuna: Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way XXVI.7

[11] Because the Being of Brahman is transcendental, it does not diminish itself by letting other objects share in its being. The sum-total of Being inherent in Brahman is always the same and no phenomenon that takes place in the empirical world can alter it even in the slightest. See: Isha Upanishad: Invocation.

[12] Chandogya Upanishad 6.1.5

[13] Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma (J. Jetley 2003) p. 22

[14] Chang: The Buddhist Teaching of Totality (Routledge 2009) p. 91

[15] Jung: C.G. Jung Speaking (Princeton University Press 1977) p. 435

[16] Except perhaps James Graham Johnston, although he certainly isn’t a ‘major’ name in the field.

[17] Kaushitaki Upanishad 1.4

[18] Jung: Psychological Types §329

[19] Though Jung did not seem to be aware of the Anaximander fragment from Greek philosophy, it reads almost exactly as something that Jung could have said about the necessity of transcending the type. The fragment (DK 12B1) reads: “The Boundless is the first principle of things that are. It is that from which the coming-to-be [of things and qualities] takes place, and it is that into which they return when they perish, by mortal necessity, giving satisfaction to one another and making reparation for their injustice, according to the order of time.”